In this article we discuss the impacts of future energy prices and biofuel production levels on agricultural market prices, production and trade and present the results of a partial equilibrium model of international agricultural trade with interconnected markets. The results of the model suggest that the long term trend of declining real agricultural commodity prices has been reversed. A key result in this regard is that the price of energy has become a major driving force of agricultural world market prices. For instance, in the period of analysis until 2016/18 the price of wheat can be expected to increase by about 16 percent, 35 percent and 91 percent depending on an oil price of US$ 45, US$ 70 and US$ 102 per barrel, respectively.
economically they did not get very far because time and again the income effect of productivity growth was eroded by declining prices.
The turn of the millennium marks a reversal of the megatrend of declining agricultural commodity prices. Since then the growth in global demand for agricultural commodities has outstripped the growth in supply. As a consequence, the trend in prices has been positive. A number of studies have analysed the different factors contributing to the increase in food prices at the beginning of the millennium (e.g. Trostle 2008; De Gorter 2008) . Other studies (e.g. Banse et al. 2008 , Miller et al. 2009 , Hazes et al. 2009 ) focussed on the implications of future energy prices and biofuel production on agricultural production and land use changes. Those studies emphasise the critical role of levels of energy prices and biofuel production for future agricultural market prices as well as production and trade developments. While it is now the consensus in the agricultural economics profession that real international food and agricultural commodity prices will tend to increase in the decades to come, the open questions are: to what extent are prices likely to rise, to what extent will potential future developments of energy prices and biofuel production contribute to higher prices and what are the impacts on agricultural production and trade.
In the remainder of this paper, we will first review the reasons for higher prices in the new few decades than in the past. In particular, we will discus the roles of the price of energy as well as the extent of bioenergy production for international markets. This discussion draws heavily on von Witzke et al. (2008) and Schwarz et al. (2009) . Then we will present the results of a projection of world market prices of selected agricultural commodities for paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of our findings and factors which affect future market developments.
Determinants of global food supply and demand growth
In the first half of the 21 st century, the global demand for food is likely to double. About half of the demand growth will be accounted for by a continued rapid population growth (table 1) . The other half will be the result of per capita income growth in developing and newly industrializing countries which will result in a significant growth in food consumption. This is exemplified for grain consumption in table 2. Other Asia 107
Sub-Sahara Africa 100
Latin America 92
Developed countries 107
World 767
Source: Adapted from Runge et al. (2003) .
The growth in global food supply is not likely to keep pace with the growth in demand for a variety of reasons. One reason is that on a global scale the land that is available for agricultural production is limited. The most productive land is already being farmed. In many parts of the world there are no major land reserves which could be mobilized for farming.
Although there are significant land reserves in some regions of the world, much of this land, such as the tropical rain forests, should not be used for farming for environmental concerns.
Von Witzke (2008) estimates that between 2000 and 2020 the world's cropland could be expanded by about 5 percent provided that agricultural commodity prices are favorable. His estimate is in line with findings by others (e. g. Hofreither 2005; IFPRI 2005) . For the production effect of this additional cropland it must be kept in mind that this land will tend to be less productive than the land that was farmed already at low prices.
According to FAO (Bruinsma 2003) there is ample supply of land around the world which is considered "suitable" or "very" suitable for agricultural production. However, these estimates are grossly misleading at best, as they disregard the availability of water and other resources for agricultural production. In addition some of this land is suitable only for a particular use.
For instance, FAO's numbers suggest that Spain has significant areas of land which are "suitable" or "very suitable" for agricultural production. However, this land could only be used for olive production, if at all.
Essentially the expansion of cropland can only be assessed realistically if the time dimension is included. Expansion of cropland requires not only suitable soils but also sufficient amounts of water, public and private infrastructure for storage, handling and processing, capital investment, skilled farmers and so on.
The limited availability of agricultural land implies that the production growth necessary to meet the world's rapidly growing needs in the decades ahead must come predominantly from productivity growth of the land already being farmed (e. g. von Witzke 2007; Runge et al. 2003 ). In the 1960 to 2000 period almost 80 percent of global production growth was the result of productivity growth and only around 20 percent were accounted for by the expansion of the agricultural acreage (Bruinsma 2003) . In the decades ahead, an even higher percentage of the production growth around the world will have to come from productivity growth (e. g. However, a sufficiently high productivity growth will be difficult to achieve. Since the times of the Green Revolution agricultural productivity growth has been declining. From the 1960s
to the 1980s annual productivity growth in world agriculture averaged around four percent.
This number is now down to one percent with a continuing tendency towards further decline (FAO 2008a and b; Pardey et al. 2007 ).
There are two central reasons for the declining agricultural productivity growth. One is that the law of diminishing returns also applies to agricultural research. That is, with its traditional breeding methods agricultural research has increasingly captured the productive potential of crops and livestock such that additional productivity gains can only be realized by ever increasing agricultural research investments. The other is that exactly this has not occurred.
To the contrary, beginning in the 1980s when the rich countries of the world felt that they were awash with food, agricultural research has been reduced significantly in the industrialized countries where about 80 percent of agricultural research takes place (Pardey, et al. 2006) . In general, there is significant underinvestment in agricultural research, as evidenced by the fact that the social rate of return to agricultural research is high (e. g. Alston et al. 2000; von Witzke et al. 2004 ).
Land suitable for agricultural production is not the only natural resource constraint to increasing food production, however. In the past agricultural production growth has always been paralleled by increased use of water for farming. Water is increasingly becoming a constraint to production as well and acts to slow down productivity growth (e. g. FAO 2007).
Furthermore, global warming will affect agriculture significantly. On balance, global production is expected to decline, all other things being equal. The tragedy in this regard is that the poorest countries of the world tend to be located in agro-climatic zones which will be most negatively affected by global warming. These countries tend to be food deficit countries and all too often they do not have sufficient foreign currency reserves to buy enough food in international markets. To make things worse, these countries tend to have only rudimentary agricultural research systems, making it difficult for them to develop technologies which would permit farmers to adapt to climate change.
In the rich countries of the world there has been a significant growth in the demand for quality components in food and agriculture. This also includes process quality. Consumers in these countries increasingly expect that the food they buy is not only healthy and wholesome and does not include residues of substances that may pose a health risk, but also that agricultural production technologies are sustainable and preserve natural resources. In essence, this implies that agricultural research now has to observe the additional constraints of sustainability and natural resource preservation and -from a societal perspective -rightly so. But in essence, observing these additional constraints also acts to slow down productivity growth.
The public debate about high food prices in 2008 has been fuelled by high energy prices and biofuel production. As OECD (2006, 2008) Agricultural commodity and energy prices have become cointegrated for another reason as well and that is the production of biofuels. Increasing energy prices increase production of biofuels. Government programs which aim at increasing biofuel production by means of subsidies, targets or other instruments also appear to be correlated with the price of energy.
To the extent that biofuel crops are produced on land which is suitable for food production this acts to reduce the availability of food. However, for a variety of reasons the trade-off between food production and biofuel production may be less pronounced than it is sometimes argued. More than 95 percent of the global biofuel production is based on solids for burning.
This includes wood, charcoal, animal manure and other agricultural by-products. Less than five percent of bioenergy is liquid fuel, based on grains, sugar cane, oil seeds and other crops (FAO 2008c) . In some cases the production of biofuels also results in high protein animal feed such as oilseeds used as inputs in the production of biodiesel. Another by-product is fertilizer in the production of biogas which has the added advantage of reducing agricultural greenhouse gas emissions (von Witzke and Noleppa 2007).
In short, global food demand growth is likely to exceed supply growth. As a consequence real international food and agricultural commodity prices will tend to increase in the decades to 
International Agricultural Market Prices in 2016/18
There are a number of empirical analyses which arrive at the result that food prices will be higher in the future than they have been in the past. prices may be expected to be higher in the future than they have been in the past, albeit only modestly. However, their analysis is based on projections about biofuel production by OECD and FAO (2007) which have turned not to be in line with the actual growth in global biofuel production.
Moreover, their analysis is based on the assumption of a constant energy price. As discussed above, the consensus among energy economists is that the times of inexpensive energy are over and that energy prices will be higher than in the past.
In the following, we will present the result of an analysis which is based on a regionally Assuming a constant biofuel production also lowers the price increase, but to a smaller extent than under a constant energy price. The exception is the corn price due to a high share of bioenergy demand. This confirms that biofuel production has an impact on rising market prices, but it in particular demonstrates that the price of energy will be a major determinant of the price of food in the decades to come. 
Crop production in selected key countries and regions in 2016/18
It is now interesting to explore changes in supply and trade under the projected market situations for these crops in the selected countries and regions in 2016/18. First, we look at changes in production starting with a more detailed look at production impacts in the EU and USA.
The changes in supply in the EU and USA under the 2016/18 base scenario are shown in table 6. Despite the increase of energy costs in the 2016/18 base scenario crop production generally increases in the EU and the USA. Only sugar production in the EU experiences a small decline.
Higher market prices driven by population growth and higher feed demand offset the potential negative production effect of higher energy cost. However, higher oil prices than the assumed US$ 70, would change the results (compare with the discussion below -table 7). Corn and oilseeds acreages are significantly expanded in both regions, increasing competition with other land uses and potentially increasing the pressure on eco-systems services from semi-natural land. Higher costs of energy use in crop production leads to a decline in the supply of wheat and sugar in the EU as a whole as well as in Germany (table 7a) . Wheat production still increases in France although only by less than 2 percent. The growth in corn and oilseed supply reflects substitution in production. Corn and oilseed acreages are expanded at the expense of other crops such as wheat and sugar. The importance of the energy price is also evident from the production increase on the EU sugar markets under low oil price of US$ 45 per barrel. On the other hand, the important role of biofuel production is particular evident for the corn and, to a lesser extent, oilseeds market. Without an increase in biofuel production the increase in corn production would decline from 26 percent to 8 percent in Germany and 24 percent to 9 percent in the EU as a whole. This effect is mainly caused by a substantially lower market price for corn. The impact on the oilseeds market is less pronounced, as favourable relative prices partly offset the impact of the lower bioenergy demand at base period level.
Similarly to European crop production, higher energy costs result in a decline in wheat production in the USA and reduce production increases on other crop markets (table 7b ). In addition, Canadian oilseeds production decreases, as increased oilseeds demand is satisfied by main oilseeds regions such as the USA and Brazil. A low energy price at base period level generally increases crop production in both regions. The impact of different energy costs is especially reflected in the production changes on the Canadian oilseeds and sugar markets.
Changes in oilseeds production vary from -3 percent to +25 percent depending on the assumed energy price. In the US constant bioenergy demand at the base period level leads to smaller production increase on corn, sugar and oilseeds markets, reflecting their use as feedstock for biofuel production and to small substitution effects from corn, oilseeds and sugar production to wheat and other grains production, in comparison to the 2016/18 base period. Higher energy costs generally reduce expected production increases in 2016/18. This impact is particularly evident on the other grains markets in Brazil and Australia, the sugar market in China, and the corn in CIS (table 7c ). The exception is the oilseeds production in Australia, where the production increase further rises from 43 percent 51 percent due to favourable changes in relative prices compared to other crops. Lower energy cost at the base period level change the production impacts on Australian corn from +26 percent with a high oil price to +41 percent and from +13 percent to +29 percent on the corn market in CIS. Constant bioenergy demand at base period level reduces expected increases in corn and sugar production in Brazil from 39 percent to 24 percent and 32 percent to 24 percent, respectively.
The projected increase in corn production in China decreases from 29 percent to 17 percent, while corn production in Australia increases only by 19 percent instead of 36 percent. In addition, the increase in Australian oilseeds production is reduced from 43 percent to 34 percent.
Overall, the 2016/18 baseline projection shows an increase in total world production from 10 percent for wheat to 30 percent for oilseeds and are in line with recent OECD projections of production increase by 10 -40 percent on agricultural markets until 2018 (OECD-FAO 2009)..
Variations in energy cost have the biggest impact on sugar production in the EU, corn production in North America, other grains production in Brazil, sugar production in China, other grains production in Australia and corn production in CIS. Increasing bioenergy demand has the biggest impact on corn production followed by sugar and oilseeds production.
Trade impacts in selected key countries and regions in 2016/18
Generally, comparing demand and supply changes, the results show that development of supply lags behind the growth in demand on most crop markets. Corn and sugar are the exception in this regard. The discussion of trade impacts of increasing energy prices and biofuel production focuses in this paper on examples of selected regional wheat, corn and oilseeds markets. Figure 3 compares the net trade position on the wheat market. The projection of the 2016/18 baseline shows that supply lags behind the growth of demand on the EU wheat market (figure 3). The decline in net trade further expands with higher energy costs. Without the increase in biofuel production, the decline in net trade is substantially smaller and a comparison with the scenario without the increase in energy prices suggests a stronger impact of biofuel production on net trade on the EU wheat market.
However, the outcome of this comparison strongly depends on the level of the implemented oil price and biofuel production in the 2016/18 baseline. The changes in net trade on the US wheat market are similar, although at larger absolute level. Net trade of Canadian wheat benefits from higher market prices and the Canadian wheat market turns from a net-importing into a net-exporting market. Figure 4 shows the dominant impact of increasing biofuel production on the US corn market.
The US corn market becomes a net-importing market in all three scenarios which assume an increase in biofuel production, with only small variations depending on the level of the energy price. Simulating the 2016/18 projection without an increase in biofuel production substantially increases net trade on the US corn market. In fact, higher energy costs have a small positive impact on net trade on the Brazilian corn market reflecting a competitive advantage of corn producers in Brazil. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the determinants of the global demand for and supply of food and their impacts on international agricultural market prices, production and trade in the EU, USA and other key agricultural trade regions. In the decades ahead, global food demand is likely to outstrip the growth in supply. As a consequence, the price of food can be expected to be higher in the future than it has been in the past. The demand growth will occur almost exclusively in today's developing and newly industrializing countries. This will significantly change the international agricultural trade flows (e. g. von Witzke et al. 2008; Bruinsma 2003) . The poor countries of the world who once were net food exporters have now become net food importers and the food gap of the poor countries is expected to quintuple in the first three decades of the 21 st century (Bruinsma 2003) . This together with increasing prices of agricultural commodities and food is a cause for concern for both world food security and agricultural greenhouse gas emissions.
The results of our analysis suggest that the price of important agricultural commodities will rise from 35 percent to 80 percent until 2016/18. The single most important determinant of price increases turned out to be the price of energy. Price increases in the order of magnitude suggested by the results of this analysis have the potential to result in grave consequences for the world's poor who live on the equivalent of one US$ a day or less.
Overall, the 2016/18 baseline projection shows an increase in total world production from 10 percent for wheat to 30 percent for oilseeds. Variations in energy cost have the biggest impact on sugar production in the EU, corn production in North America, other grains production in Brazil, sugar production in China, other grains production in Australia and corn production in CIS. Increasing bioenergy demand has generally the biggest impact on corn production followed by sugar and oilseeds production. Trade impacts of the 2016/18 baseline projection are mixed for the EU and US. Positive trade impacts can be identified on the oilseeds, other grain and sugar markets in both regions as well as on the EU corn market. Biofuel production is the main determinant of changes in net trade on the US corn market as well as a major driver of net trade on the German oilseeds market and the Brazlian sugar market. However, the impacts and importance of energy prices and biofuel production for agricultural trade varies between commodities and regions. Substantial increases in net imports on the corn, oilseeds, other grains and sugar markets provide new export opportunities for main exporting regions such as the US (oilseeds) and CIS (other grains).
The projected increase in global crop production shows that current productivity growth rates are not sufficient to satisfy food demand in 2018. Given that natural resources for agricultural production, including land, water and fossil energy, are limited, higher productivity growth in world agriculture is the key to the production growth necessary to meet the growing needs of the world's population. Productivity growth is also crucial for the reduction of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the conversion of forests and pasture into cropland.
The realisation of the projected large production increases on the EU corn and oilseeds markets strongly depend on the availability of additional agricultural land for crop production.
In the absence of significant substitution effects in agricultural production it is unlikely that large amounts of additional land would be available for crop production in the EU. In fact, growing competition between agricultural land use and nature conservation and housing demand could further reduce the amount of land available for agricultural production in the EU. In addition, demand outgrowths supply on other crop markets such as wheat, reducing EU net exports to the world market. The results of this study already project an increase in crop production in the Rest-of-the-World region, which includes developing countries, from 15 percent (wheat) to 36 percent (oilseeds). Further shifts of agricultural production from the EU to other regions could increase the pressure on food production in developing countries.
Many developing countries have a significant agricultural production potential but are far from realizing it. Making productive technologies such as modern seed varieties, synthetic fertilizer and crop protection available for farmers in developing countries has the potential to reap benefits quickly, in particular if they are paralleled by agricultural extension education services as well as a sound macroeconomic and monetary policy and a liberal agricultural trade policy. These investments will only be undertaken if the economic, political, institutional and legal environment is such that innovation in agriculture is encouraged.
Increasing agricultural research and education investments now is crucial for achieving productivity growth in the future. Research suggests that it may take between 25 and 50 years for such investments to fully pay off for society (Pardey 2009 ).
However, the modelling results strongly depend on assumed increases in oil prices and biofuel production. To highlight the impacts of variations in oil prices different scenarios with different energy price levels have been analysed, which confirm the important role of oil prices for agricultural production and trade. Assumptions in relation to future biofuel production strongly depend on future development of biofuel policies. Current biofuel production is largely driven by policy mandates and targets as well as other specific support measures such as tax cuts and changes in biofuel policies will thus strongly affect the demand for agricultural crops for bioenergy production.
The implemented shift effects for increasing biofuel production in the EU are smaller than in previous analyses reflecting a more conservative outlook for biofuel production Germany.
Recent changes in biofuel policies in the EU, e.g. changes in tax cuts and reductions in biofuel quotas in Germany, could also indicate a rethinking of policy support strategies for biofuel production (BMU 2008 , Schwarz 2009 ). Future medium to long term biofuel scenarios might change considerably depending on the breakthrough of different technologies and the support for different types of bioenergy production pathways.
